Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy

Does the core business genuinely avoid or reduce emissions, or build climate resilience? Share of revenue that is actually 'green'. Fossil-dependent models score low.

The core product — wind turbines — is one of the most effective emissions-avoidance technologies available, with SGRE's installed fleet enabling customers to avoid over 356 million tonnes of CO2 per year; the SG 14-236 DD is among the largest offshore turbines ever built, and SGRE holds roughly 60% of the non-Chinese offshore market, making it a structurally critical climate actor.

Credible, science-based targets (SBTi), a real net-zero plan with progress to date, and CDP disclosure — not just a dated press release.

SBTi validated SGRE's 1.5°C-aligned emission reduction targets in 2020; the company claims carbon neutrality in operations since 2019 and 100% renewable electricity since 2020; GHG reports are externally verified by TÜV Rheinland under ISO 14064-1:2018; however, Scope 3 supply-chain targets remain partially unmet (FY24 Scope 3 rose vs. FY23), and post-acquisition reporting is now consolidated under Siemens Energy rather than published independently by SGRE, reducing granularity.

Operational footprint, labour and social practices, and governance quality across the company's own operations and supply chain.

SGRE holds a CDP Climate Change 'A' rating (for the third consecutive year as of last publication) and an EcoVadis Gold medal (score 75/100), ranks #1 in sector from ISS ESG and FTSE Russell, and is in the 99th industry percentile on S&P Global's CSA; however, the 2023 quality scandal revealed that internal governance was insufficient to catch systemic product defects before they reached the field, and the company conceded it 'sold wind turbines that were not sufficiently tested', which is a significant ESG governance failure.

Quality of disclosure, independent third-party verification, and how much hard data backs the company's claims.

SGRE publishes annual GHG reports independently verified by TÜV Rheinland per ISO 14064-1:2018, discloses all three scopes, files via CDP (A-list), and publishes a Consolidated Non-Financial Statement; disclosure quality is above average for the sector, but since full acquisition by Siemens Energy in 2023, SGRE-specific stand-alone reporting has been partially subsumed into the parent's consolidated sustainability report, reducing segment-level verifiability.

Controversies, litigation, pollution, fossil-fuel lobbying, conflict-zone involvement and governance scandals. Higher means cleaner.

The 2023 quality crisis — faulty rotor blades and bearings across 15–30% of the 4.X and 5.X onshore fleet, €4.5 billion net loss, Siemens Energy CEO admitting 'too much had been swept under the carpet', a German government €7.5 billion bailout, and a 2024 partial wind-farm shutdown in Norway due to confirmed manufacturing defects — represents a severe and material integrity event; these are not environmental pollution controversies but they directly undermined the company's core climate delivery promise and indicate suppressed internal risk reporting.